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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
NORMA LOIS COOPER,
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs
FORESTERS UNDERWRITERS, INC.,
a corporation,

APPELLANT'S
BRIEF
No. 8105

Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action on an insurance policy issued
by Appellant to Respondent on March 31, 1951,
which provides for certain medical, surgical and
hospital benefits described in the Policy (See Exhibit attached to Amended Complaint, Record 3 to
6). This case was submitted to the Court on a
written Stipulation of facts, which is as follows:
1. That Plaintiff submitted her application
for insurance coverage and paid her first
month's premium and application fee thereon
to Moses Leese, Agent of Defendant, at approx-
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imately 9:00 p.m. on the 31st day of March,
1951.
2. That Plaintiff's application for insurance
was accepted by Defendant and Certificate No.
A-145 was issued to Plaintiff pursuant to the
application mentioned above.
3. That on May 7, June 18, July 17, August 27, and October 1, all in 1951, Plaintiff paid
premiums of Six ($6.00) Dollars each to Defendant on said insurance policy.
4. That the premium payment on October
1, 1951, was made in the afternoon of that date.
5. That on October 31, 1951, in the afternoon, Plaintiff was injured in a fall at the Culligan Soft Water Service Company store, Salt
Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
6. That in the evening of October 31, 1951.,
after the accident occurred, the Plaintiff paid
the sum of Twelve and no/100 ($12.00) Dollars,
to Moses Leese, an Agent of the Defendant.
7. That as a result of her fall and injuries
Paintiff was hospitalized and expended more
than Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars formedical, surgical and hospital services.
8. That Plaintiff made timely demand upon
the Defendant for payment of insurance benefl. ts under her policy of insurance, but Defendant denied and still denies liability thereunder
and has refused to pay.
9. That Defendant is now and at all times
herein mentioned has been qualified in the State
of Utah as a fraternal benefit society.
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10. That at the time of the accident complained of by the Plaintiff, certain by-laws and
regulations had been duly adopted by Defendant and were in full force and effect, which
read in part as follows:
"LAPSATION
"1. A member enrolling for membership,
regardless of the time of day that the application is made, his coverage shall start as of
the time payment is received but shall be
dated as of 12 :00 o'clock noon the day premium is received and for said premiums received his coverage would continue in force
for one month from that date and in addition would have a 31-day grace period at
which time, if no other premiums were received, his membership would terminate at
12 :00 o'clock noon of the 31st day of grace.
If a member shall have lapsed it is considered
that he must pay all back premiums in order
to reinstate and the due date shall remain
the same as originally stated in his membership certificate and he will be penalized not
only the payment of back premiums but his
coverage shall become effective for accident
only from the time reinstatement premium
was received and all other coverage shall commence 10 days thereafter. All coverage shall
begin and end at 12:00 o'clock noon, standard time, at the residence of the insured.
Where lapsation has been in excess of three
months and reinstatement is desired the above
can be accomplished or new application must
be made with a 90-day waiting period being
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in effect for all coverage except accident which
would be in immediate benefit from the time
premium was received."
"GENERAL PROVISIONS
"4. If default be made in the payment of
the agreed premium for this certificate, the
subsequent acceptance of a premium by the
organization or by any duly authorized agents
shall reinstate the certificate, but only to
cover accidental injury thereafter sustained
and such sickness as may begin more than
ten ( 10) days after the date of such acceptance."
11. That the Amended Answer of Defendant may be considered as an Answer to the
Amended Complaint of Plaintiff. (Record 10,
11 and 12.)

Based upon the foregoing the trial Court entered judgment in favor of Respondent (Record 15),
from which this appeal has been taken.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I

THE POLICY HAD LAPSED AT THE TIME
OF THE ACCIDENT.
II
THE GRACE PERIOD EXPIRE AT NOON
ON OCTOBER 31, 1951.
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III
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO.1 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT.
IV
ARGUMENT
Point No. III will not be argued separately, but
is included in the discussion under Points No. I
and II.
I

THE POLICY HAD LAPSED AT THE TIME
OF THE ACCIDENT.
The policy contains the following proVISions
(See Exhibit attached to Amended Complaint):
"This Certificate is dated and takes effect
March 31, 1951, in consideration of the statements and agreements made by the insured in
the application and the payment in advance of
$6.00 as the first premium, which maintains
this Certificate in force for one month from
its effective date. The payment in advance and
acceptance by the Company of premiums monthly of $6.00 thereafter is required to keep this
Certificate in continuous effect. The Company's
acceptance of the premiums will constitute its
consent for renewal. All periods of insurance
hereunder shall begin and end at twelve o'clock
noon, standard time, at the residence of the insured.
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"SECTION V. GRACE PERIOD. A grace
period of thirty-one ( 31) days will be allowed
for payment of any renewal premium during
which grace period the Certificate will remain
in full force."
"SECTION VII. (3) No statement made
by the applicant for insurance not included herein shall void the certificate or be used in any
legal proceeding hereunder. No agent has authority to change this Certificate or to waive any
of its provisions. No change in this Certificate
shall be valid unless approved by an executive
officer of the organization and such approval
be endorsed hereon."
" ( 4) If default be made in the payment of
the agreed premium for this Certificate, the subsequent acceptance of a premium by the Organization or by any of its duly authorized agents
shall reinstate the Certificate, but only to cover
accidental injury thereafter sustained and such
sickness as may begin more than ten days after
the date of such acceptance."
The policy provides for monthly "periods of
insurance" which begin and end at noon on the last
day of each month, commencing March 31, 1951,
and required the payment of a monthly premium
of $6.00 to keep the "certificate in continuous effect."
The first premium paid the policy to April 30, 1951,
at noon, and the premiums paid during the months
of May, June, July and August paid the policy to
noon of the last day of each of those months. The
payment made on October 1st was made on the last
day of the grace period and paid the policy to noon
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of September 30, 1951. The last "period of insurance" was from noon September 30th to noon October 31st. October having 31 days, the grace period
corresponded with the "period of insurance" and
evpired on October 31, 1951. The premium for this
"period of insurance" was not paid during the grace
period, therefore the policy had lapsed at the time
the accident occurred in the afternoon of October
31, 1951. The payment made in the evening of
October 31st does not alter the result for the reason
that Section VII ( 4) of the policy provides for reinstatement "only to cover accidental injury thereafter
sustained."
II
THE GRACE PERIOD EXPIRED
ON OCTOBER 31, 1951.

~T

NOON

The trial Court apparently took the position
that the law does not recognize fractions of days
and that the grace period ran until midnight October
31, 1951. That the law does not take cognizance of
fractions of days as a general rule is recognized.
We are also a ware of Section 68-3-7 of the Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows:
"68-3-7. TIME, HOW COMPUTED.-The
time in which any act provided by law is to be
done is computed by excluding the first day and
including the last, unless the last is a holiday,
and then it also is excluded."
But the rule adopted by the trial court is a mere
legal fiction and subject to limitations as stated in
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52 American Jurisprudence, Pages 340 and 341, as
follows:
"The general rule that the law knows no fractions of a day is a mere legal fiction, and, like
all other legal fictions, is allowed to operate only
in cases where it will promote right and justice.
"And although the ends of justice never require that the law depart from the ordinary
rule and recognize a fraction of a day to defeat
the manifest intention of the parties, where
the parties to a contract stipulate for the performance of the contract by an agreed hour on
a certain day, the law in such case will take
cognizance of the fractions of the day."
Perhaps the most common exception to the above
general rule in the field of insurance is found in
cases where the policy expires at a certain time of
day, such as in Mutual Benefit Health and Accident,
vs. Kennedy, 140 Fed. 2d 24, where the policy expired at noon on a certain day and it was held that
where the insured drowned two hours thereafter
there was no coverage. The same proposition is
found in Shankle, vs. Home Insurance Company of
New York, 133 S. W. 2d 289 (Tenn.) where the
policy provided for coverage from December 5,
1936, to December 5, 1937, at Noon Standard Time,
place of issue, and it was held that an accident which
occurred at 7:30 p.m. on December 5, 1937, was
not covered. The Court in the Shankle case observed
that the principle that the law knows no part of
a day has no application to a contract having a
definite hour for its expiration.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

The Certificate provides "all periods of insurance hereunder shall begin and end at Twelve o'clock
Noon, Standard Time, at the residence of the insured." Thus, not only the hour of beginning, but
also the hour of ending of each "period of insurance"
is specifically set forth. There is no ambiguity in
the wording of the provisions. Likewise, the case at
bar should be distinguished from one where the
policy provides for a definite hour of commencement
on a certain day, but fails to specify a definite hour
of termination. The question for decision is whether
the time specified in the policy as to the beginning
and ending of the "period of insurance" applies to
the grace period, the grace period not having such
a specification. The wording of the grace provision
is:
"A grace period of thirty-one (31) days will
be allowed . . ."
The trial court apparently held that the grace
period expired at midnight on October 31, 1951.
This does violence to the policy in that it allows 317i
days of grace instead of 31 as provided for therein.
The interpretation of Appellant is the only one consistent with the terms of the policy.
There are a number of cases which have specifically held that the grace period, renewal period,
etc., although not specifically limited as to hour, are
limited by the other provisions of the policy. In
the case of Richardson, vs. American National Insurance Company, 137 S. 370 (La.) the following
are the pertinent provisions of the policy:
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"In consideration of the . . . payment in
advance of a policy fee of Two Dollars and a
premium of $1.95 does hereby insure Thomas
Richardson, subject to all the conditions herein
contained and endorsed hereon, from 12:00
o'clock noon, standard time, of the day this
contract is dated, until 12:00 o'clock noon,
standard time, of the 15th day of February,
1925, and for such further periods, stated in
the renewal receipts, as the payment of the premium specified in said application will maintain this policy and insurance in force, against
death or disability ... "
" ( 2) A period of five ( 5) days of grace is
allowed for the payment of any renewal premium, during which the policy shall be maintained in full force and effect in accordance
with its terms, but if the payment of any renewal premium is made after the grace period
of the policy has expired neither the Insured
nor the Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover
for any accidental injury sustained between the
date of such expiration and 12 :00 o'clock noon,
standard time, of the day following the date
of such renewal payment; or for any illness originating or death occurring before the expiration of ten ( 10) days after the date of such
renewal payment.
"(3) If default be made in the payment of
the agreed premium for this policy, the subsequent acceptance of a premium by the Company
or by any of its duly authorized agents shall reinstate the Policy, but only to cover accidental
injury thereafter sustaip.ed and such sickness
as may begin more than ten days after the date
of such acceptance."
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The pre1nium due at noon on February 15, 1929,
was not paid until February 22, 1929. The insured
was fatally shot on February 20, 1929, at 4 :45 p.m.
It was contended that inasmuch as the grace period
provision was not limited to noon that the insured
had until six p.m., or sunset of the last day to pay
the premium in accordance with a provision of the
Louisiana law. The Court held that the grace period
expired at noon of the last day. The language of
the Court is as follows :
"We conclude that, under both the common law
and the codal article, contracting parties have
the right to stipulate for the performance of
the contract by an agreed hour on a certain day
and the law in such case will take cognizance
of the fractions of the day.
"The argument of plaintiff's attorney is predicated upon only a few words of the clauses in
question, which he attempts to isolate from the
language of the balance of the clause and the
other clauses in the policy. To accept this interpretation would be to give the plaintiff not only
five days grace, but five days, four hours, and
forty-five minutes. We do not believe that this
was contemplated by the parties and that the
language in question must be interpreted in connection with the remainder of the clause and
also the other provisions of the policy, which,
as a whole, show that the policy commenced and
ended at 12 o'clock noon, whether it was terminated upon the expiration of the term or upon
the termination of a renewal period, or upon
the termination of the grace period. All of the
periods of time in the policy are based upon 12
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o'clock noon. We find no uncertainty or ambiguity or conjecture in the language of the
policy on this point."
Orlando, vs. Rosen, 290 N. Y. S. 270. This case
involved a workmen's compensation policy which
was written to expire on November 11, 1934, at
12 :01 a.m. By a rider attached, the policy was extended for a period of one month to expire on December 11, 1934. The rider contains the following
provision: "Subject otherwise to all terms, limitations and conditions of the policy to which this endorsement is attached." The claimant was injured
at two p.m. on December 11, 1934. It was held that
the policy had expired some hours earlier that day.
Purvis, vs. Commercial Casualty Co., 159 S. E.
369 (S.C.) (1931). The defendant insured Jack W.
Purvis "for the term of twelve months from the 3rd
day of September, 1928, from Noon Standard Time"
against loss or disability or death from accidental
means. On September 3, 1929, about five o'clock in
the afternoon Purvis was fatally injured. The Court
held that the policy had lapsed at the time of the injury and stated as follows :
"In the case at bar, the parties stipulated in
the contract, as was their right, that the insurance should be for a term of twelve months, beginning at noon of September 3, 1928; in view
of the fact that the insured was fatally injured
a few hours after noon on September 3, 1929,
it would be an injustice to the insurer for the
court to hold, nothing else appearing, that the
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insurance was in force during the whole of that
day."
The Plaintiff contended that a receipt book
issued by the company contained a notation that
the premium must be paid on or before September
3, 1929, and that by reason of there being no limitations as to time of day when the premium should
be paid that the insured had the entire day to make
payment thereof. In discussing this point, however,
the Court said :
"The receipt book contains notice that such
premium must be paid on or before September
3, 1929. The policy indicates that it was the
clear intent of the parties that the insurance
should expire at 12 o'clock noon September 3,
1929. There is nothing in the receipt book to
indicate a contrary intention; the notice that
the renewal premium must be paid on or before
September 3, 1929, merely meaning, in connection with the provisions of the policy, that, if
payment should be deferred until that date, it
must be made by 12 o'clock noon. It being conceded that the renewal premium, was not paid
by or before 12 o'clock noon of September 3,
and that the insured received his injuries some
hours thereafter, it is clear that the policy was
not in force at the time of the fatal accident."
The Court will recall this case was before it
on a prior appeal in which the judgment of the trial
Court was vacated and the case remanded for
further proceedings. Cooper, vs. Foresters Underwriters, Inc., ------------------------------------------Utah __________________________________________ ,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
257 Pac. 2d 540. The present and former judgments
entered by the trial Court were apparently based
on the theory that the grace period did not expire
until midnight on October 31, 1951. Appellant contends that by vacating the former judgment this
Court rejected the theory of the trial Court and that
the judgment now appealed from should be vacated
for the same reason. Except the ruling of this Court
in the prior appeal of this case, our search has not
revealed a Utah case exactly in point on the facts.
However, Fawcett, vs. Security Benefit Association,
99 Utah 193, 104 Pac. 2d 214,' 218, is a case involving the construction of an insurance con tract and
the principle of construction therein adopted is determinative of the question involved in the .case at
bar. The language of the Court is :
"Since such provision of the certificate is not
so clear as to be susceptible of but one construction, we must determine which of the permissible interpretations thereof is consistent with
the other provisions of the entire agreement.
Even though a particular provision of a contract of insurance be susceptible of more than
one meaning, the construction of such provision
more favorable to the assured will not be
adopted if other provisions of the entire contract
clearly resolve the ambiguity in favor of the
contrary construction."
There is no ambiguity in the con tract in the
case at bar. The trial court went beyond and outside the contract and adopted a legal fiction contrary to its terms. The contract can not be rendered
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ambiguous by a strained misapplication of a legal
fiction. In the Fawcett case, where the contract
itself was susceptible of more than one meaning,
this Court adopted the interpretation consistent with
the other provisions of the entire contract. In the
case at bar, where an alternative interpretation is
made possible only by a legal fiction, this Court is
bound to follow the holding in the Fawcett case and
adopt the interpretation which is consistent with
the entire provisions of the contract.
The Argument thus far has been based upon
the provisions of the Certificate only. Appellant's
position is well founded upon the provisions of the
Certificate without resort to the By-Laws. However,
the following provision of the By-Laws supports
Appellant's contention:
"1. A member enrolling for membership, regardless of the time of day that the application
is made, his coverage shall start as of the time
payment is received but shall be dated as of
12 :00 o'clock noon the date premium is received
and for said premiu1ns received his coverage
would continue in force for one month from
that date and in addition would have a 31-day
grace period at which time, if no other premiums were received, his membership would
terminate at 12 :00 o'clock noon of the 31st day
of grace."
Respondent will probably urge that the ByLaws are not a part of the contract, for the reason
that no reference to them was made in the Certifi-
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cate. Section 31-29-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
provides in part as follows :
"The certificate, together with any riders or
endorsements attached thereto, the charter, the
constitution and laws of the society, the application for membership, and declaration of insurability, if any, signed by the applicant, and
all amendments to each thereof, shall constitute
the agreement between the society and the member, and the certificate shall so state.
It would seem that where the statute specifically
makes the By-Laws a part of the contract that such
is conclusive regardless of whether the Certificate
so states or not. We have found no case holding to
the contrary.
IV
THE RIGHT OF FORFEITURE WAS NOT
WAIVED.
The judgment of the trial Court is not based
upon a waiver. There was no finding of waiver.
However, it is anticipated Respondent will claim
there has been a waiver and will rely upon the
following circumstances in support of her claim
of waiver: The first premium was paid in the
afternoon of March 31, 1951, and coverage started
at noon of that day; that the payments on October 1, 1951, a11d October 31, 1951, were accepted unconditionally ; that the payments on October 1, 1951, and October 31, 1951, were made
in the afternoon of those days, after the grace period
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had expired; that Appellant never tendered back
to Respondent any premiums. No waiver exists by
reason of such circumstances.
The policy became effective on March 31, 1951,
at noon. That the premium was paid and the policy
issued later that day is of no consequence. Had the
policy been dated the following day Respondent
would not have been covered by insurance until
Noon of the following day. Undoubtedly it was to
the advantage of Respondent to have immediate coverage and that is why the policy was dated on the
date of the payment of the premium. No interference arises from this incident that a pattern of
accepting premiums late was established.
The premium on October 1, 1951, was paid in
the afternoon of said day. Whether paid in the forenoon or afternoon, makes no difference. If paid in
the forenoon Appellant was obligated to accept the
premium as the grace period had not expired. If
it was paid in the afternoon Appellant had the legal
right to accept the payment and apply it to the September coverage. Respondent enjoyed coverage during the month of September, which Appellant was
entitled to be compensated for. The authorities hold
that even in the event of forfeiture the insured is
not relieved of the obligation to pay for the period
the policy is in force. 44 C. J. S. 1331, Mass. Union
Mut. Casualty Ins. Corporation, vs. Insurance Budget Plan, 195 N. E. 903, 291 Mass. 62, 98 A. L~ R.
1422. Mo.-General Service Corporation vs. Allhoff
Bros., App., 139 S. W. 2d 1062. Neb.-Bleicher v.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
Heeter 4 N. W. 2d 897, 141 Neb. 787. N. Y. Great
American Indemnity Co., v. Greenberg Bros. Iron
& Steel Corporation, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 656, 170 Misc.
489 - Commercial Casualty Co. v. Rice, 157 N. Y. S.
1, 93 Misc. 567.
The payment of $12.00 on October 31, 1951,
Vilas made in the afternoon of said day, but after the
accident had occurred. Appellant applied $6.00 of
that amount to the October coverage and the remaining $6.00 was used to reinstate the policy. However, the policy could be reinstated only according
to its terms:
"REINSTATEMENT. The right of the
sured to have the policy reinstated after
fault in the payment of a premium, and
rights under the policy as reinstateed, are
terminted by the provisions of the policy."
C. J. S. Page 558.

indehis
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The only limitation on reinstatement was that
is covered accidental injury thereafter sustained.
The policy does not require a new application
or evidence of insurability in order to effect a reinstatement. No reason existed to alter the date of
covrage if reinstatement occurred on the last day
of the month which had always been the date determining monthly coverage. The policy having been
reinstated there was no occasion to tender back any
premiums to Respondent.
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The cases heretofore relied upon by Respondent
to establish waiver have no application to the case
at bar.
In Ellerbeck, vs. Continental Casualty Company, 63 Utah 530, 227 Pac. 850, the insurance
company had forwarded statements to the insured
demanding payment of the annual premium. There
had been a conversation between a representative
of the insurance company and the insured wherein
a credit arrangement had been granted by the company to the insured and the company had accepted
a partial payment of the premium for the period in
question.
In Loftis, vs. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Company, 38 Utah 532, 114 Pac. 134, arrangements
had been made with the employer of the insured to
deduct premiums from his wages. The insurance
company submitted a list to the employer containing
the names of policy holders and the amount of premiums owing for the months involved. It was made
to appear that the insurance company knew other
employees who had not earned sufficient wages each
month to pay insurance premiums promptly when
due. Several instances of default of payment had
occurred, which the insurance corn pany had disregarded. The corn pany had demanded and received
payment of premium and treated them as though
they had been timely paid.
In Vinther, vs. Sunset Mutual Life Insurance
Company, 53 Pac. 182 (Cal.) it was made to apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pear that ten payments had been made late and
accepted by the company, one of which was as much
as 38 days late.
In Sullivan vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 91 Utah 405, 64 Pac. 2d 351, the wife of the
insured was told before the expiration of the grace
period by a representative of the company that
"When Mr. Sullivan sends the money to you, bring it
in." She was also told it would be all right to bring
it in after the grace period expired, and was also
advised that in case the money does not arrive for
some time she could take an application for reinstatement form and have Mr. Sullivan fill it out
and bring it in when he returned home.
In Watkins, vs. Brotherhood of America Yoemen (Mo.) 176 S. W. 516, it was made to appear
that it was the practice of the company to permit
payments to be made after the due date in 80%
to 90% of the cases and in such instances to reinstate the policy.
In Bonnot, vs. Grand Lodge Brotherhood of
R. R. Trainmen (Mo.) 81 S. W. 2d 360, the Court
found the company had waived a forfeiture where
it was shown the Treasurer of its local lodges had
been permitted to accept premiums late.
In Knarston, vs. Manhattan Life Insurance
Company (Cal.) 56 Pac. 773, it was made to appear that a general agent had granted a ten day
extension and had attempted to collect the premium
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on two occasions after the ten days had elapsed and
the general agent had testified that he would have
accepted the premium had it been tendered to him
on the date of the death of the insured.
In Huber, vs. New York Life Insurance Company (Cal.) 63 Pac. 2d 318, it was held that the
company was estopped under the circumstances to
deny that an agent to whom payment had been
made within the time allowed by the policy had
authority to collect the premium.
The test of waiver is stated by this Court in
Ballard, vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 82
Utah 1, 21 Pac. 2d 84 7, as follows:
"Insurance company which, by any course of
conduct, induces in mind of insured honest belief, reasonably founded, that strict compliance
with stipulation for prompt payment of premiums will not be insisted on, waives right to
forfeiture for nonpayment."
According to this test none of the element~ of
waiver exists in the case at bar. No "course of
conduct" was "reasonably founded" which could
have induced in the mind of Respondent an honest
belief that strict compliance would not be insisted
upon. There is no question but what all payments
prior to October 1st had been made within the grace
period. Although the October 1st payment was made
in the afternoon of that day such does not establish
a "course of conduct" upon which waiver can be
predicated. None of the above cases so hold, and
such is not the law.
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The following provision of the By-Laws sustains Appellant's position with regard to waiver:
"If a member shall have lapsed it is considered that he must pay all back premiums
in order to reinstate and the due date shall
remain the same as originally stated in his
membership certificate and he will be penalized
not only the payment of back premiums but
his coverage shall become effective for accident
only from the time reinstatement premiums
was received and all other coverage shall commence 10 days thereafter.
CONCLUSION
The amount involved in this case is small. It
would have been far less expensive for Appellant
to have paid Respondent's claim. The Court will
appreciate that in denying Respondent's claim Appellant bears no ill will toward Respondent and is
not trying to avoid its legal obligations, but contends that according to law Respondent was not
covered by the policy of insurance in connection with
the claim herein sued upon.
Respectfully submitted,

ROMNEY AND BOYER
Attorneys for Appellant
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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